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NATURE OF THE CASE
By this lawsuit Mickelsen Construction, Inc. (hereinafter "Mickelsen Construction")
attempted to collect $34,980 from Lesa D. Horrocks (hereinafter "Horrocks") and Sunshine
Secretarial Services, Inc. (hereinafter "Sunshine Secretarial") which is the amount of a check dated
.I anuary 8, 2009, given by Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial to Mickelsen Construction to guarantee

payment of that amount to Mickelsen Construction by Alan Smith (hereinafter "Smith") and
Accelerated Paving, Inc. (hereinafter "Accelerated").
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Mickelsen Construction filed suit on June 30, 2010. (R., p. 1) HOlTocks and Sunshine
Secretarial answered on July 22, 2010. (R., p. 8) On October 29, 2010, Horrocks and Sunshine
Secretarial moved for summary judgment. (R., p. 35) Oral argument was presented on January 31,
2011. (Tr., p. 4) On February 2,2011, the trial court granted summary judgment to Horrocks and
Sunshine Secretarial.

(R., p. 59)

Judgment in favor of Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial

dismissing the Complaint was entered the same day. (R., p. 74) Mickelsen Construction filed this
appeal on March 7,2011. CR., p. 82) Judgment for attorney fees was entered on May 11,2011. (R.,
p.90)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In early 2009, Mickelsen Construction threatened to file a materialman's lien against a
project in which Accelerated was involved. (R., pp. 27, 47) Accelerated, through its Vice President,
Smith, requested that Mickelsen Construction not file the lien because that would prevent
Accelerated from getting paid on the project. (R., pp. 27, 47, 48) Smith offered to pay by credit
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card but explained that he would have to use the project payment to pay the balance on his credit
card before he could obtain the credit necessary to fund the credit card payment. (R., pp. 27, 48)
Mickelsen Construction agreed not to file the lien on the condition that Smith and Accelerated
obtain someone to guarantee the payment by credit card which was offered by Smith and
Accelerated. (R., p. 48)
Defendant Horrocks leased space, provided secretarial services and provided other in-house
services to Accelerated. (R., pp. 22,23) Horrocks agreed to guarantee the credit card payment of
Smith and Accelerated and to do so wrote a Check on the account of Sunshine Secretarial Services,
Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks in the amount of$34,980.00 on January 8, 2009 1 (the "Check"). (R., pp.
23,28,48) A copy of the Check is attached to the Complaint. (R., p. 5)
Dehvyn Mickelsen of Micke1sen Construction made arrangements with Justin Hokansen at
the Bank of Commerce in Blackfoot to facilitate the transaction. (R., pp. 48,52) Delwyn Mickelsen
understood that the credit card would be run at the Bank of Commerce and when the funds were
received from American Express the funds would be deposited into the account of Mickelsen
Construction. The Check would then be returned to Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial. (R., pp. 48,
52) Instead, Smith!Accelerated and Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial contacted American Express,

lHon'ocks and Smith state in their Affidavits that Horrocks wrote the Check so that
Delwyn Mickelsen could "hold it" until the money from the credit card transaction was received.
(R., pp. 23,28) Mickelsen, on the other hand, states definitely in his Affidavit that he requested
somebody guarantee the payment by credit card and Horrocks agreed to guarantee the credit card
payment. (R., p. 48) The distinction reveals questions of fact which could only be resolved at
trial. (Tr., pp. 11, 12) Mickelsen understood the Check was to guarantee the transaction.
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial and Smith!Accelerated understood that the credit card funds
would be deposited in the account of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial to fund the Check, making it
an original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial.
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satisfied themselves that the credit card transaction had been approved, ran the credit card on
Sunshine Secretarial's machine and waited for the money to be sent through in the ordinary course
of business to fund the Check. (R.. pp. 23,28)
Brent L. Grigg of Accelerated notified Mickelsen Construction on or before January 14,
2009, that the credit card transaction was not honored by American Express and asked for additional
time to work out an arrangement with American Express. CR., pp. 28, 33, 49, 50). Delwyn
Mickelsen honored that request and it was not until January 26, 2009, that the Check was presented
for payment. (R., p. 49) The Check written by Horrocks on the account of Sunshine Secretarial
Services, Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks bounced and despite numerous demands the checking account
on which the Check was written never had sufficient funds for the Check to be honored and paid.
(R., p. 48) Copies ofletters from Idaho Central Credit Union dated January 26,2009 and January
27,2009 verifying this fact are attached to the Complaint. (R., pp. 6, 7)
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was Respondent Horrocks' version of the transaction sufficient to establish that the
obligation was an original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial making 1. C. §9-505
inapplicable?

2.

Were the differing versions of the transaction contained in the affidavits of Mickelsen and
Horrocks sufficient to create a material question of fact as to whether the obligation was an
original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial thus making summary judgment
inappropriate?

3.

Was the delivery of the Check by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial coupled with the business
relationship between Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial and Smith/Accelerated sufficient to
establish, as a matter of law, beneficial consideration for the promise to guarantee the
payment to Mickelsen Construction?

4.

Was the delivery of the Check by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial coupled with the business
relationship between Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial and Smith/Accelerated sufficient to
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create a material question of fact whether there was beneficial consideration for the
promise to guarantee the payment to Mickelsen Construction, thereby precluding summary
judgment?
5.

Was the Check a sufficient writing to comply, as a matter oflaw, with the requirement of
1. C. §9-505 that promises to answer for the debt of another be in writing?

6.

Was the Check sufficiently definite to create a material question of fact whether the Check
was an enforceable guarantee?

7.

Did the trial court err by dismissing the Complaint of Mickelsen Construction when the
Complaint stated a valid claim to enforce the Check as a negotiable instrument against
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial?

8.

In the event the summary judgment and/or the judgment dismissing the complaint is reversed
should the award of attorney fees below also be reversed because Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial would no longer be the prevailing party?

9.

If Mickelsen Construction prevails on appeal is it entitled to an award of attorney fees
pursuant to 1. C. §12-120(3)?
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The prevailing party on appeal is entitled to attorney fees because 1. C. § 12-120(3) provides

that the prevailing party in an action on a negotiable instrument guaranty or commercial transaction
is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee:
(3) In any civil action to recover on an . . . negotiable instrument, guaranty, or
contract.
and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the
court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3)
The Check delivered by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial to Mickelsen Construction is a
negotiable instrument on which Mickelsen Construction is entitled to collect regardless of how the
issue of whether Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial is an original obligor or a guarantor is resolved.
Attorney fees are awarded under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) to the prevailing party in a case involving
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a negotiable instrument. If HOlTocks/Slllshine Secretarial is determined to be an original obligor,
attorney fees are appropriate as a case involving a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12120(3).

If HOlTocks/Sunshine Secretarial is detennined to be a guarantor, attorney fees are

appropriate as a case involving a guaranty under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Pinnacle Eng'rs 1'. Heron

Brook, LLC., 139 Idaho 756, 761 (Idaho 2004) (Idaho Code § 12-120 (3) mandates the award of
attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court admitted there were questions offact whether this transaction was an original
obligation or a guarantee. However, the trial court still granted summary judgment and dismissed
Mickelsen Construction's Complaint.

The trial court elToneously reasoned that there was

insufficient consideration to support an original obligation and the Check was an insufficient note
or memorandum to show that HOlTocks/Sunshine Secretarial intended to guarantee Accelerated's
debt to Mickelsen Construction.
HOlTocks/Sunshine Secretarial had a business relationship with Accelerated - it rented office
space to Accelerated and provided secretarial services. That business relationship coupled with the
Check was sufficient to establish beneficial consideration (i.e. subserve a business purpose) or, at
a minimum, was sufficient to create a question of fact precluding summary judgment.
The Check Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial delivered to Mickelsen Construction was a
sufficient note or memorandum of the promise to answer for the debt of Accelerated. It was written
on the account of HOlTocks/Sunshine Secretarial; was signed by HOlTocks; was dated; identified
Accelerated; and was for the exact amount HOlTocks/Sunshine Secretarial agreed to guarantee. The
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a negotiable instrument. If Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial is determined to be an original obligor,
attorney fees are appropriate as a case involving a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12120(3).

If Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial is determined to be a guarantor, attorney fees are

appropriate as a case involving a guaranty under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Pinnacle Eng'rs v. Heron

Brook, LLe., 139 Idaho 756, 761 (Idaho 2004) (Idaho Code § 12-120 (3) mandates the award of
attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial cOUli admitted there were questions of fact whether this transaction was an original
obligation or a guarantee. However, the trial court stilI granted summary judgment and dismissed
Mickelsen Construction's Compliant.

The trial court erroneously reasoned that there was

insufficient consideration to support an original obligation and the Check was an insufficient note
or memorandum to show that Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial intended

to

guarantee Accelerated's

debt to Mickelsen Construction.
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial had a business relationship with Accelerated - it rented office
space to Accelerated and provided secretarial services. That business relationship coupled with the
Check was sufficient to establish beneficial consideration (i.e. sub serve a business purpose) or, at
a minimum, was sufficient to create a question of fact precluding summary judgment.
The Check Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial delivered to Mickelsen Construction was a
sufficient note or memorandum of the promise to answer for the debt of Accelerated. It was written
on the account of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial; was signed by Horrocks; was dated; identified
Accelerated; and was for the exact amount Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial agreed to guarantee. The
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trial court stated that for purposes of the motion it had to accept as true that Horrocks agreed to
guarantee the Accelerated debt. Yet, inexplicably the trial court granted summary judgment against
Mickelsen Construction because the Check was insufficient to show a meeting of the minds as
content to guarantee Accelerated's debt.
The trial court became so consumed in the intricacies of the law on whether the oral
agreement was an original obligation or a guarantee, that it forgot that Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial
delivered the Check to Mickelsen Construction. The Check was independently enforceable, yet the
trial cOUli dismissed the entire Complaint. The trial court must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
A.

HORROCKS/SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL BECAME THE ORIGINAL OBLIGOR
MAKING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (I.C. §9-505) INAPPLICABLE OR AT LEAST
A QUESTION OF FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER IT BECAME THE ORIGINAL
OBLIGOR

1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for the appellate

court is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Summary
judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are
to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Castorena v. GE, 149 Idaho 609, 613 (Idaho 2010)
The appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw, including the interpretation
of a statute. Such an interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and "[w]here the
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language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction." If a statute is ambiguous, the appellate court attempts to
ascertain the Legislature's intent by examining the "language used, the reasonableness of proposed
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." Ward v. Portneu/1vfed. Ctl'., Inc., 248 P.3d 1236,
1239 (Idaho 2011)
2.

DISCUSSION
In opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial,

Mickelsen Construction argued that under HOlTocks' version of the transaction, HOlTocks/Sunshine
Secretarial became the original obligor which made the Statute of Frauds inapplicable. (R., pp. 44,
45; Tr.,pp.12, 17, 18)
In her Affidavit, Horrocks states that Accelerated gave Sunshine Secretarial its American
Express credit card, and on January 8, 2009, "I ran the credit card through Sunshine's credit card
machine." Horrocks goes on to state that she satisfied herself that the transaction was approved by
American Express and delivered the Check to Mickelsen Construction in the amount of$34,980 to
be held until the funds came to her bank. (R., p. 23) According to Brent L. Grigg, the "plan was that
Sunshine would run the Accelerated American Express card, gain approval for said transaction, and
Sunshine would write Mickelsen a check for the total amount when the money came in." However,
because Mickelsen wanted a check that day, Horrocks claims she delivered the Check with the
understanding that Mickelsen would hold the Check until the funds came to her bank. (R., pp. 32,
33,23) Mickelsen Construction's understanding was different. Delvvyn Mickelsen was willing to
forego his lien and accept a credit card payment only if Smith and Accelerated found somebody to
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guarantee the payment. Lesa Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial gave Mickelsen Construction a check
dated the same day, January 8, 2009, in the amount of $34,980. (R., p. 48) After Sunshine
Secretarial ran the credit card and satisfied itself that the transaction was approved, American
Express cancelled the credit card on or about January 14, 2009. CR., pp. 28, 33)

Sunshine

Secretarial did not end up receiving the money from American Express. CR., p. 24)
The trial court analyzed whether the first three subpmis of Idaho Code § 9-506 were
applicable to the transaction at issue. Mickelsen Construction agrees that if Idaho Code § 9-506
eliminates the need for a -writing, such a result will be determined by one of the first three
subsections. 2
§ 9-506. Original obligations -- Writing not needed. - A promise to answer for
the obligation of another, in any of the following cases, is deemed an original
obligation of the promisor, and need not be in writing:

1. Where the promise is made by one who has received property of
another upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise; or
by one who has received a discharge from an obligation in whole or
in part, in consideration of such promise.
2. Where the creditor parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in
consideration of the obligations in respect to which the promise is
made, in terms or under circumstances such as to render the party
making the promise the principal debtor, and the person in whose
behalf it is made, his surety.
3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another,
is made upon the consideration that the party receiving it cancels the
antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute
therefor; or upon the consideration that the party receiving it releases
the propeliy of another from a levy, or his person from imprisonment

As will be discussed below a judicially created exception, the "main purpose" rule, can
also take the oral agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. The trial court erroneously concluded
that the only exception was the "main purpose" rule and failed to independently evaluate the
exceptions found in 1. C. §9-506.
2
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under an execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent
obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor,
whether moving from either party to the antecedent obligation, or
from another person.
The trial court concluded that the agreement by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial was not an
"original obligation" and therefore 1. C. §9-506 did not apply to take the transaction out of the Statute
of Frauds. CR., p. 68) Citing the "main purpose" rule found in Restatement 1st of Security, § 93 3
and the rule found at 72 Am.

JUL

2d Statute of Frauds § 125, the trial court reasoned that the

consideration, if any, for the promise to pay the debt of Smith/Accelerated was not beneficial to
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial: "In short, Horrocks must substitute itself as the primary obligor in
exchange for valid consideration and benefits, to have created an original obligation to pay the debt
of another." CR., pp. 67,68)
This case was before the trial court on Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial's motion for summary
judgment. The trial court was obligated to construe all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving
party, Mickelsen Construction, and draw all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
in favor ofthe non-moving party, Mickelsen Construction. Fuller v. Callister, 252 P .3d 1266, 1269
(Idaho 2011) "\Vhether an oral promise constitutes a collateral or an original obligation, for the
purposes of the statute of frauds, is generally a question for the finder of fact." Dalby v. Kennedy,
94 Idaho 72,481 P.2d 30 (1971); Wright v. Wright, 97 Idaho 439,546 P.2d 394 (1976); Beaupre

v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 614 (Idaho 1985)

3Restatement 2d of Contracts, § 116 also contains the most recent statement of the rule.
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The trial court relied heavily on the "main purpose" rule in deciding that Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial's promise was not an "original obligation." (R., p. 66) "Whenever the main purpose and
object of the promisor is not to answer for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business
purpose of his own, his promise is not within the Statute". Williston on Contracts §22.23. This
exception applies ifHorrocks/Sunshine Secretarial derived their own benefit from the promise which
would make it an original promise, not a collateral obligation. Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 488,
12 S.Ct. 58,59-60,35 L. Ed. 826 (l981)("Whenever the main purpose and object of the promisor
is not to answer for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of his own,
involving either a benefit to himself or damage to the other contracting pmiy, his promise is not
within the statute .... ")
The trial court acknowledged that a questi on of fact existed as to whether this transaction was
an original obligation or a guarantee. (Tr., pp. 11 - 12; R., p. 65) Instead of waiting until trial to
resolve the obvious fact issues, the trial court decided that if it was an original obligation there was
inadequate consideration (i.e. "beneficial consideration") to make the promise an "original
obligation." (R., pp. 67, 68) The trial court cited the following quote from Beaupre v. Kingen, 109
Idaho 610,614 (Idaho 1985): "The trial judge is the arbiter of whether the evidence indicating an
original obligation is sufficient to allow the statute of frauds question to go to the jury." Based on
that quote the trial court apparently decided that it could weigh the evidence and determine if
Horrocks received any benefit from entering into this agreement.
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The trial court placed the burden of showing that Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial did not
receive "any benefit" from the transaction on Mickelsen Construction. CR., p. 68) This was an
affim1ative defense of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial and was not part of the claim Mickelsen
Construction was making against Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial. Horrocks stated in her Affidavit
that she received no "financial benefit from this transaction." (R., p. 24) Financial benefit is not the
only form of beneficial consideration. Mickelsen Construction pointed out that there was a business
relationship between Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial and Smith/Accelerated. CR., pp. 22,23; Tr., pp.
15 - 17) The trial court ignored any inference from that in a footnote stating "there is no evidence

to suggest that Horrocks agreed to guarantee the debt because of that relationship." CR., p. 68, fn 10)
One can, and the trial court should have, inferred from these facts that Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial
received some beneficial consideration from this transaction.
The trial court rejected Mickelsen Construction's agreement not to lien Accelerated's project,
the business relationship which existed between Accelerated and Horrocks and the lessor/lessee
relationship as evidence of consideration for the agreement. (R., p. 68) The fact is that this \vas
more than an oral promise to guarantee the obligation of Smith/Accelerated. Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial actually gave Mickelsen Construction a check for $34,980.00. That coupled with the
other evidence certainly either demonstrated beneficial consideration or created an inference that
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial's promise benefitted it and that its purpose was to "subserve some
pecuniary or business purpose" of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial.
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The trial court also seemed to believe that the "main purpose" rule completely eliminates the
other exceptions contained in I. C. §9-506 4 • The "main purpose" rule is a creature of judicial
decisions. Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479,488,12 S.Ct. 58, 59-60, 35 L. Ed. 826 (1981) Tore, Ltd.

v. Church, 105 Nev. 183,186 (Nev. 1989) (the "main purpose," "original promise" or "leading
object" doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds which was explained almost a century ago
by the U. S. Supreme Court and has since gained widespread approval)

1. C. §9-506 is not a

codification ofthe "main purpose" rule, but instead describes other situations in which the "promise
to answer for the obligation of another" is an "original promise." 1. C. § 9-506(2)5 provides as
follows:
2. Where the creditor parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in consideration
of the obligations in respect to which the promise is made, in terms or w1der
circwnstances such as to render the party making the promise the principal debtor,
and the person in whose behalf it is made, his surety.

4The 1926 decision in Reed v. Samuels, 43 Idaho 55, 62 (Idaho 1926) does suggest that
the consideration must benefit the promisor, but the decision does not suggest nor hold that the
"main purpose" rule is the same as the five separate and distinct exceptions contained in 1. C. 9506.

5For I. C. 9-505(1) to apply HOlTocks/Sunshine Secretarial must have "received property
of another." While that was celiainly contemplated when the transaction was entered into it
failed to materialize. For 1. C. 9-505(3) to apply, the obligation of Smith/Accelerated would have
had to be cancelled. Again, that was certainly contemplated when the transaction was entered
into, but when neither Smith/Accelerated nor HOlTocks/Sunshine Secretarial paid as promised,
Mickelsen Construction pursued both parties.
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South Dakota has adopted the exact same exception to the Statute of Frauds as that contained
in 1. C. §9-506(2). In Am. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Hoich, 560 F.3d 780, 792 (8th Cir. S.D. 2009), the
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals held:
To prove the applicability of this exception, "the plaintiff is obliged to prove
the following: (1) that plaintiffbecame a creditor by parting with something of value;
(2) that the defendant promised to answer for the obligation created; and (3) that the
circumstances were such as to render the promisor the principal debtor."

(1) Mickelsen Construction parted with something of value - its right to lien the project of
Accelerated where it supplied materials. (Hallowell v. Turner, 94 Idaho 718, 721 (Idaho 1972) (The
waiver of a right or forbearance to exercise the same is a sufficient consideration for a contract,
whether the right be legal or equitable, or exists against the promisor or a third person»; (2)
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial promised to answer for the obligation created. (R., p. 64@fn 7: "For
purposes of this opinion, the Court accepts as true that Horrocks agreed to guarantee the Accelerated
debt."); (3) By giving Mickelsen Construction a check, the circumstances were such as to render
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial the "principal debtor." (Mickelsen Construction is a holder in due
course and is entitled to enforce the instrument, the Check in this case. See 1. C. §§ 28-3-301,302,
303)

There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether the

exception contained in 1. C. § 9-506(2) applied.

B.

THE CHECK WAS A SUFFICIENT WRITING UNDER 1. C. §9-505(2)

1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an order for summary jUdgment, the standard of review for the appellate

court is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Summary
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judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to ajudgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are
to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Castorena v. GE, 149 Idaho 609, 613 (Idaho 2010)
The appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw, including the interpretation
of a statute. Such an interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and" [w]here the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction." If a statute is ambiguous, the appellate court attempts to
ascertain the Legislature's intent by examining the "language used, the reasonableness of proposed
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." Wardv. PortnelifMed. Ctl'., Inc., 248 P.3d 1236,
1239 (Idaho 2011)
2.

DISCUSSION

§ 9-505. Certain agreements to be in writing. In the following cases the
agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in
writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of
the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its
contents:

2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except
in the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code.
In opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial,
Mickelsen Construction argued below that the Check Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial delivered to
Mickelsen Construction was a sufficient writing to comply with the Statute of Frauds which is
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codified at 1. C. §9-505. CR., pp. 42,43,44; Tr., pp. 12, 13, 14, 15) For purposes of its opinion. the
trial court accepted as true that Horrocks agreed to guarantee the Accelerated debt. CR., p. 64 @ fn
7) However, in complete derogation of that statement, the trial court granted summary judgment
against Mickelsen Construction because the Check "fails to show a meeting of the minds or show
that the parties shared a mutual intent.

. that it is a guarantee and what the tenns and conditions

ofthat guarantee are." (R" pp. 71, 72)
A guarantee is an undertaking or promise on the part of the guarantor which is collateral to
a primary or principal obligation and binds the guarantor to perfOlmance in the event of nonperfonnance of the principal obligor. Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Rocca, 100 Idaho 228, 232 (Idaho
1979)

The Check in question is signed by Lesa Horrocks; is drawn on the bank account of

Sunshine Secretarial and Horrocks; is made payable to Mickelson Construction; is for $34,980;
identifies that it is "For Accel." which is sufficient to identifY Accelerated; and is dated the same date
that it was delivered to Mickelsen Construction. (R., p. 5). I. C. §9-505 only requires some "note
or memorandum" of the agreement to be in writing and "subscribed by the party to be charged." At
a minimum there is a question of fact whether the Check qualifies as a "note or memorandum" of
the agreement. It was signed or "subscribed,,6 by Lesa Horrocks. The Check is a negotiable

Generally, the signature required by the statute of frauds may be any symbol made or
adopted by a party, with an actual or apparent intent to authenticate the writing and give it force
and effect. [citations omitted] The traditional form of signature is, of course, the handwritten
name ofthe signer. But initials or any symbol may also be used; and the signature may be written
in pencil, typed, printed, made with a rubber stamp or impressed into the paper. George W
Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 389 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988)
6
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instrument. (1. C. §28-3-104) "An obligation on a negotiable instrument or a guaranty written on
the instrument is not within the Statute of Frauds." Restatement 2d of Contracts. § 120
The trial court relied heavily on Gu?f Chern. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. VVilliams, 107
Idaho 890, 894 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) for its conclusion that there was no meeting of the minds. CR.,
pp. 70, 71) In that case the lender disbursed loan funds in a check which stated on the back "You
are obligated to furnish a negotiable title to the vehicle . . . within thirty days after endorsement
of this check. Failure to furnish a negotiable title will constitute liability for any expenses required
to procure" The seller furnished the title to the bon-ower but the borrower failed to deliver it to the
lender. The lender attempted to hold the seller liable for the amount of the loan arguing that the
language on the back of the check created a contract requiring the seller to deliver the title to the
lender. The Court of Appeals held that an enforceable contract was not established against the seller
because the language imprinted on the check failed to specify what obligation, if any, was imposed
on the seller, i.e. "you"was too indefinite. That holding does not support a finding that the Check
in this case was an inadequate "note or memorandum" ofHon-ockiSunshine Secretarial's promise
to answer for the debt of Accelerated. The Check definitely obligated Hon-ocks/Sunshine Secretarial
to pay the $34,980 to Mickelsen Construction for Accelerated. The obligation to pay is the very
essence of the agreement to guarantee.
The trial court also cited Hilt v. Draper, 122 Idaho 612, 621 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) for the
proposition that a "check by itself does not create a contract."

(R., p. 70, fn 12) In that case a

farmer agreed to sell hay to a hay hauler. The hay hauler agreed to sell hay to a dairy. The dairy
owner gave the hay hauler a check as part payment for 400 tons of hay. After delivering some hay
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to the hay hauler the farmer sold the remainder of his hay to another dairy. The dairy owner who
gave the check to the hay hauler tried to argue that the check created a contract with the farmer to
sell the dairy owner 400 tons of hay. In that context the Court of Appeals held that the check did not
create such a contract. Contrast that with this case where Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial gave
Mickelsen Construction the Check for the entire amount of the debt it was guaranteeing for
Accelerated. As a "note or memorandum" of the agreement it was more than adequate.
The trial court also cited Hoffman v. S V Co., 102 Idaho 187, 188 (Idaho 1981) to support its
conclusion that the Check was an insufficient note or memorandum of the agreement to guarantee
the debt of Accelerated. (R., pp. 71, 72) HOiTman dealt with the purchase and sale of a 1.64 acre
undeveloped lot. The holding was that the "check standing alone" did not contain the terms of the
agreement to purchase the lot because the only notation carried on that check is the phrase "Escrow
Ruud Mtn. Lots." This case does not involve the purchase and sale of real property over time which
would require the parties to identifY the property, the terms of payment, the interest rate, etc.. It
involves Lesa Horrocks' one time promise to guarantee the debt of Accelerated to Mickelson
Construction. The Check sufficiently memorializes the agreement.

The Check was signed by

Horrocks; was dated January 8, 2009; identified Accelerated; was made payable to Mickelsen
Construction; and was for the exact amount to be guaranteed. It contained all the tenns of the
agreement.
The trial court also referenced Restatement of Contracts §207 to support its decision.
Restatement 2d of Contracts, § 131 is the newest restatement ofthe law on this issue. It provides:
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Unless additional requirements are prescribed by the particular statute, a contract
within the Statute of Frauds is enforceable if it is evidenced by any writing, signed
by or on behalf of the party to be charged, which
(a) reasonably identifies the subject matter of the contract,
(b) is sufficient to indicate that a contract with respect thereto has been made between
the parties or offered by the signer to the other party, and
(c) states with reasonable certainty the essential terms of the unperformed promises
in the contract.
In Comment 17 it states: "A lends $ 1,000 to B, and as part ofthe transaction C orally agrees
to guarantee repayment. To evidence the guaranty, C signs a written promise to pay A $ 1,000. The
written promise is a sufficient memorandum without any statement of consideration."
In this case Mickelsen Construction agreed to forego filing a lien on Accelerated's project
for Accelerated's promise to pay the $34,980 it owed Mickelsen Construction. HOlTocks/Sunshine
Secretarial orally agreed to guarantee the payment. To evidence the guarantee, Horrocks/Sunshine
gave Mickelsen Construction a check for $34,980. The Check is a sufficient memorandum to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds.
C.

THE CHECK IS ENFORCEABLE IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER IT IS SUFFICIENT
AS AN ORIGINAL OBLIGATION OR AS A GUARANTY

1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw, including the interpretation
of a statute. Such an interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and "[w]here the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, cOUl1s give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction." If a statute is ambiguous, the appellate cOUl1 attempts to
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ascertain the Legislature's intent by examining the "language used, the reasonableness of proposed
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." Ward v. PortneufMed. etr.. Inc., 248 P.3d 1236,
1239 (Idaho 2011)
2.

DISCUSSION
The Check prepared and signed by Horrocks on the accowlt of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial

is a negotiable instrument. (1. C. §28-3-104) The holder of a negotiable instrument is entitled to
enforce it. (1. C. §28-3-301, 302) Mickelsen Construction is a holder of the negotiable instrument
and sued on the Check. (R., pp. 1 - 7) Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial admitted the Check was drawn
on its account and delivered to Mickelsen Construction. (R., pp. 9, 10,23)
The trial court erred in dismissing Mickelsen Construction's Complaint because it is still
entitled to enforce the negotiable instrument (the Check) against Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial.
D.

IN THE EVENT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR THE JUDGMENT DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT IS REVERSED THE ORDER AWARDING ATTO~NEY FEES AND
JUDGMENT SHOULD ALSO BE REVERSED
The trial cOUli awarded attomey fees to Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial as the prevailing

parties below. If this matter is reversed and remanded either because the summary judgment order
is reversed or because the matter is remanded for further proceedings on the negotiable instrument
issues, the Judgment for Attomey Fees should also be reversed because Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial would no longer be the prevailing party below.
785, 789 (Idaho 2004)
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Stanley v. Lennox Indus., 140 Idaho

CONCLUSION
The trial court decided this case as if there was nothing more than an oral promise by
Honocks/Sunshine Secretarial to pay Mickelsen Construction, whether it be by original obligation
or by a guaranty. The fact is that Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial gave Mickelsen Construction the
Check drawn on the bank account of Honocks/Sunshine Secretarial for the $34,980. The Check
coupled with the other business relationship facts was sufficient to establish, as a matter oflaw, that
Hon"ocks/Sunshine Secretarial received beneficial consideration making it an original obligation of
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial to Mi ckelsen Construction. At a minimum, those facts create genuine
issues of material fact which should not be resolved on motion for summary judgment.
A guaranty is a promise on the part of the guarantor (Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial) to
perform in the event of non-performance of the principal obligor (Smith/Accelerated). What better
note or memorandum of Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial's promise than the Check to Mickelsen
Construction for the amount Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial agreed to guarantee? The trial court,
however, decided that the Check was not definite enough to be enforceable as a guaranty. At a
minimum, the Check created genuine issues of material fact which should not be resolved on motion
for summary judgment.
Most egregious, the trial court dismissed Mickelsen Construction's entire Complaint despite
the fact that Mickelsen Construction is the holder of a negotiable instrument which it is entitled to
enforce against Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial irrespective of how the 1. C. 9-505 and 506 issues are
resolved.
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Mickelsen Construction submits that the district court's award of summary judgment to
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial should be reversed, the judgment dismissing the Complaint should
be set aside, the order and judgment awarding attorney fees and costs to Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial should be reversed and set aside, and the case should be remanded for a determination
whether Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial is an original obligor, guarantor and/or liable on the
negotiable instrument to Mickelsen Construction.
DATED this

;;,s-r'day of August, 2011.
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